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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. 
THOMAS M. VIGIL, 
: Case No. 940614-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. 
: Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
This is an appeal from three convictions of theft by 
deception, second and third degree felonies, in a criminal case. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (2) (f) provides this Court's jurisdiction 
over this case. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court conduct an inadequate voir dire? 
On appeal, this Court reviews a trial court's 
performance of jury voir dire with the abuse of discretion 
standard of review. State v. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201, 205 (Utah 
App. 1992). "Whether a trial court abused its discretion in 
conducting voir dire depends on whether, considering the 
totality of the questioning, counsel was afforded an adequate 
opportunity to acquire the information necessary to evaluate 
[prospective] jurors.7" Id. (citation omitted; brackets by the 
Court). 
The issue was properly preserved by trial counsel's 
pre-submitted voir dire questions, and objection to the trial 
court's failures to ask requested questions. (R. 709, 710, 718, 
719, 725). 
2. Did the trial court give the jury an erroneous 
instruction? 
In reviewing this question on appeal, the Court reviews 
it as a question of law, for correctness. State v. Ontiveros, 
835 P.2d 201, 205 (Utah App. 1992). The Court reviews "jury 
instructions in their entirety and will affirm when the jury 
instructions taken as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the law 
applicable to the case." Id. (citation omitted). 
This issue was properly preserved by trial counsel's 
objections. (R. 1164-1171). 
3. Did the trial court err in blocking the presentation 
of defense evidence and in denying jury instructions requested by 
the defense? 
The standard of review on the jury instruction aspect 
of this issue is a correction of error standard of review. 
Ontiveros, supra. The standard of review on the evidence aspect 
of this issue is more deferential. The record must show a clear 
abuse of discretion. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 
1994) . 
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The issue was properly preserved by trial counsel's 
objections to the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury, and 
by trial counsel's efforts to present the evidence. (R. 1151-
1158; 1164-1171) . 
4. Was trial counsel constitutionally ineffective in 
failing to request proper defense instructions, and did the trial 
court commit plain error in failing to give these instructions? 
Because the trial court was not presented the 
ineffective assistance issue, this Court must determine whether 
trial counsel was ineffective as a matter of law. Salt Lake City 
v. Grotespas, 874 P.2d 136, 138 (Utah App. 1994). Review of 
trial counsel's performance is to be "'highly deferential'" and 
is to avoid "'distorting effects of hindsight.'" id. (citations 
omitted). 
In assessing the plain error question, this Court 
should determine whether the errors below were both obvious and 
harmful. State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah), cert, denied, 
110 S.Ct. 62 (1989). This Court has the discretion to dispense 
with the obviousness requirement where the error was harmful in 
retrospect, but may not have been readily apparent to the trial 
court and counsel. Id., 773 P.2d at 3 5 and n.8. See also State 
v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989)(applying plain error 
standard to failure to given jury instructions sua sponte). 
The issue was not raised below. 
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5. Did the trial court err in its interpretation of the 
statutes governing this case, in concluding that the facts 
alleged here could constitute theft by deception? 
"The appropriate standard of review for a trial court's 
interpretation of statutory law is correction of error." State 
v. James. 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991). 
The issue was properly preserved by trial counsel's 
motions to quash the bindover orders and motions to dismiss the 
case. (R. 19-69; 183-233; 560; 1052-1053). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following constitutional and statutory provisions 
are included in Appendix 1 to this brief: 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 7 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 10 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 12 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 26 
Constitution of Utah, Article V section 1 
United States Constitution, Amendment V 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, section 1 
United States Constitution, Article VI 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-2-3 04 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-401 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-402 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-405 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-7-203 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-1-6 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 19 
Utah Rule of Evidence 4 01 
Utah Rule of Evidence 4 02 
Utah Rule of Evidence 403. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State of Utah charged Mr. Vigil in district court 
case number 931901607 with two counts of theft by deception 
involving Rex Bushman and Frank Elizondo (R. 170-172), and in 
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district court case number 931901605 with one count of second 
degree felony theft by deception involving Paul Halliday (R. 7). 
Roger K. Scowcroft of the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
was appointed to represent Mr. Vigil (R. 13; 175). 
Magistrate Hutchings bound the cases over to district 
court on October 12, 1993 (R. 2; 163). At his district court 
arraignment on October 25, 1993, before Judge Medley, Mr. Vigil 
entered pleas of not guilty to all charges (R. 17; 181). Mr. 
Vigil moved to quash the bindover orders (R. 19-69; 183-233; 
560), and the district court denied the motions (R. 82; 261, 
582) . 
Mr. Vigil moved to sever the two counts in district 
court case number 931901607 (R. 235-239; 560-566). The State 
opposed this motion (R. 252-260), and moved to join both cases 
against Mr. Vigil in a trial on similar cases filed against Mr. 
Vigil's wife, Tonya (R. 75-81; 245-251). The trial court joined 
all counts and cases together for one trial (R. 261, 585-586). 
The jury convicted Mr. Vigil as he was charged (R. 3 93, 
394, 397). 
Judge Medley sentenced Mr. Vigil to serve three 
concurrent terms of zero to five, one to fifteen and one to 
fifteen years at the Utah State Prison on September 19, 1994 (R. 
149; 419, 420). Mr. Vigil filed his amended notice of appeal on 
October 7, 1994 (R. 151). He moved Judge Medley to grant a 
certificate of probable cause (R. 127-148; 413-418), but the 
judge denied the motion (R. 150; 421; 433-435). 
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After the notice of appeal was filed, a conflict of 
interest caused the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association to 
withdraw as counsel for Mr. Vigil, and Patrick L. Anderson now 
represents Mr. Vigil on appeal. 
This Court consolidated the appeals of the cases, which 
were tried together in the district court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
DEFENSE CASE 
Thomas and Tonya Vigil were married and living with 
five children in their home in the summer of 1992. Tonya went to 
her physician for a tubal ligation and discovered that she was 
pregnant. Because the Vigils were financially destitute, they 
decided to give up the expected child for adoption. The Vigils 
made arrangements to give up the unborn baby for adoption to 
three separate families. During the course of the transactions, 
the prospective adoptive parents gave the Vigils money for 
expenses. The Vigils did not give up their child for adoption to 
the Elizondo couple because the Vigils had disagreements and 
difficulties with the attorney representing the Elizondos. The 
Vigils did not give up their child for adoption to the Bushman 
couple because of difficulties with Mr. Bushman, mainly because 
Mr. Bushman told them that he had decided not to adopt the child 
himself, but would find another unspecified adoptive family. The 
Vigils did not give up their child for adoption to the Hallidays 
because after the child was born, they could not part with her. 
The Vigils kept their baby. They did not inform any of the 
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couples when the child was born, and did not inform any of the 
couples that they were receiving expense money from other 
couples. (R. 1062-1151). 
STATE'S CASE 
COUNT I 
Rex Bushman was a Salt Lake adoption attorney whom 
Tonya Vigil called to arrange the adoption. When the Vigils met 
with him in person on February 28, 1993, he drafted and they 
signed a document indicating that he would find a family to adopt 
their baby. He asked the Vigils if his own family might adopt 
their child, and they agreed. He offered to pay for medical 
expenses and they agreed. He drafted and they signed an 
agreement for the payment of maternity expenses on March 5, 1993. 
The agreement indicated that they would return the expense money 
in the event that the adoption did not go through. He also 
drafted and they signed a form purporting to waive any conflict 
of interest stemming from his dual roles as their attorney and a 
prospective parent. (R. 754-761). 
On approximately March 3, 1993, Mr. Vigil called Mr. 
Bushman twice, indicating the Vigils' need for living expenses of 
approximately $1,500. Mr. Bushman had agreed to pay $500 in 
living expenses, and then agreed in writing to pay them $1,000 
after their consent to the adoption was final. Mr. Bushman wrote 
a check to Jim Corbett for $3 90 for their rent, and a check to 
Mrs. Vigil for $110. (R. 761-766). 
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Mr. Bushman maintained contact with the Vigils, but had 
decided not to adopt the Vigil baby. Sometime after March 19, 
1993, Mrs. Vigil told him the adoption was still on. He called 
again later and found that the telephone had been disconnected, 
and he then called the police. The adoption never went through, 
and the Vigils never repaid Mr. Bushman the $500. (R. 766-769). 
Mr. Bushman testified that he would not have paid the 
Vigils $500 if he had not intended to obtain the baby. When 
asked if he considered the money a gift or charitable donation, 
he indicated that he found that idea "preposterous." He also 
testified that he would not have given the Vigils the $500 if he 
had known that other people were paying the Vigils in 
anticipation of adopting the baby. (R. 769). 
COUNT II 
Fransisco Elizondo was attempting to adopt a child 
through an attorney named John Giffen, beginning in 1992. His 
legal contacts informed him that the Vigils had indicated an 
interest in having him adopt their child, so he called Mrs. Vigil 
on the telephone in October of 1992, when she was living with her 
mother. After further telephone contact with Mrs. Vigil, Mr. 
Elizondo arranged to pay $500 a month for her pregnancy expenses 
through Mr. Giffen's office. He paid $1,200 to get Mrs. Vigil 
into an apartment in November of 1992, and paid a total of 
$4,300. John Giffen testified that the Vigils received about 
$5,300. Elizondo and his wife flew to Salt Lake City from their 
home in California to visit the Vigils in February. Mrs. Vigil 
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told him the baby was due in March, and forms she filled out for 
Mr. Giffen specified March 27, 1993, as the due date. (R. 879-
895; 927; 975-976). Later in February, Thomas Vigil called Mr. 
Elizondo and asked him to change attorneys because Mr. Vigil was 
not happy with John Giffen. The Vigils did not like the way the 
money was being managed through the trust, and wanted it to come 
directly to Mr. Vigil. John Giffen confirmed that Mr. Vigil had 
had disagreements with him because Mr. Vigil wanted more money 
and wanted the money sent to him. There was also a problem 
because Mr. Giffen's assistant did not obtain medication 
necessary to treat Mrs. Vigil's yeast infection. (R. 889; 905-
907; 914; 918; 954-955; 958; 1010). 
Mr. Elizondo maintained contact with the Vigils in 
March of 1993, until their telephone was disconnected. He later 
learned through Mr. Giffen's assistant that the Vigils had had 
the baby on March 18, 1993, and had decided to keep her. (R. 895-
897, 908). 
Mr. Elizondo testified that he knew that there was no 
guarantee that the adoption would go through, that he did not 
consider the money he paid to be a charitable contribution, that 
he would not have paid them had he known that others were paying 
them at the same time, and that he never got any money back from 
the Vigils. (R. 897-898; 913). 
He had a civil lawsuit pending against the Vigils, 
which was filed by Paul Halliday (R. 921). 
COUNT III 
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Paul Halliday and his wife, Vicky Halliday, were 
working through an attorney, Marilyn Fineshriber, in an effort to 
adopt a child, in March of 1993. Mrs. Vigil had originally 
contacted their attorney about the prospective adoption on March 
3, or March 4, and the Vigils met with the attorney on March 7, 
or March 8 of 1993. Mrs. Vigil said the prospective due date for 
the birth of the child was August 28, 1993. Mr. Halliday made 
arrangements to pay $900 in expenses to the Vigils on March 12, 
1993, after Mrs. Vigil told the attorney on March 7, 1993, that 
the Vigils were about to be evicted, and another $600 on March 25 
or 26, 1993, in response to Mr. Vigil's call to the attorney 
indicating that the Vigils' telephone had been disconnected and 
that they needed money to pay their utilities. The receipts from 
the checks to the Vigils from the law firm indicate that the 
payments were charitable donations. Mrs. Vigil told the attorney 
on March 23, 1993, that the Vigils were planning to go through 
with the adoption. The Hallidays did not adopt the Vigil baby. 
(R. 803-810; 821-836; 860; 868). 
Mr. Halliday testified that he did not consider the 
$1,500 a gift to the Vigils, that he was not repaid by the 
Vigils, and that he would not have paid the money had he known 
that they would not receive the baby or that other people were 
also trying to adopt the baby (R. 810-811). 
Mr. Halliday admitted on cross-examination that his 
attorney had informed him that the $1,500 was a charitable 
contribution, and that the money did not guarantee that the 
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adoption would go through (R. 815). He testified that he had a 
civil suit pending against the Vigils (R. 818). 
Mr. Vigil called the Hallidays' attorney on April 6, 
1993, and told her that they had not intended to defraud anyone, 
but had decided to keep the baby, and would pay back the money. 
He also told her that a California couple had just offered to pay 
their expenses, and that he had made no commitment to give the 
child up for adoption. (R. 867). 
LEGAL ADVICE TO THE VIGILS 
Marilyn Fineshriber, the Hallidays' attorney, testified 
that she told the Vigils that the money from the Hallidays was a 
charitable contribution, and legally could not buy their consent 
to the adoption, or obligate them to go through with it. (R. 
848-849; 864) . 
John Giffen, the attorney representing Frank Elizondo 
and the Vigils, informed all parties that the money from Mr. 
Elizondo did not buy the consent to the adoption, but was 
considered a charitable contribution. He gave the Vigils a form 
detailing adoption-related crimes under California law, which 
indicated that it is a crime to receive pregnancy expenses with 
the intent to withhold consent to the adoption. He testified 
that in going over the form he drafted entitled, "Pitfalls of 
Adoption," regarding various provisions of California law, he 
told the Vigils that it was illegal to accept money from other 
couples, and explained that Utah law is similar to California's, 
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and counseled them about the vulnerable emotional state of the 
prospective adoptive parents. (R. 930-932; 992). 
Mrs. Vigil testified that John Giffen did not go over 
the forms with them, or advise them about any legal issues 
surrounding adoption, but sent his non-law-trained assistant to 
bring the Vigils the forms. (R. 1121-1122). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A new trial is required because the voir dire in the 
instant case did not provide trial counsel with adequate 
information with which to assess the prospective jurors. The 
trial court's failure to ask the jurors about their fairness and 
impartiality, about their independence in deliberations, and 
about the impact of their exposure to media concerning attempted 
adoptions, constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
The trial court erred in giving the jury an instruction 
which purported to carve out a theft by deception exception from 
the statute which requires that all moneys given to birth parents 
by prospective adoptive parents be charitable donations. The 
instruction was inconsistent with Utah statutes and cases, and 
was prejudicial to Mr. Vigil. 
The trial court erred in blocking Mr. Vigil's 
presentation of his defense evidence pertinent to his motivation 
in seeking out successive prospective adoptive couples. The 
court compounded the error by refusing his requested defense 
instructions which elucidated his motivation for seeking out 
successive prospective adoptive couples. 
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Trial counsel and the trial court prejudiced Mr. 
Vigil's defense by failing to give the jurors two jury 
instructions established by statute, which would have provided 
defenses to Mr. Vigil's actions. 
The trial court erred in ruling that charitable 
contributions by prospective adoptive parents can be the object 
of theft by deception charges. This Court should resolve this 
issue by ordering the case dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE INADEQUATE VOIR DIRE REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL. 
A. TRIAL COURTS MUST CONDUCT AN ADEQUATE JURY VOIR 
DIRE. 
The state and federal constitutions require trial 
courts insure fair trials by conducting sufficient voir dire 
proceedings. E.g. State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 and nn. 1-6 
(Utah 1988)(citing Article I, sections 7, 10 and 12 of the Utah 
Constitution, and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution), reversed on other grounds. State v. 
Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994). The Utah Supreme Court has 
exercised its supervisory power to reiterate to the trial courts 
of this state that it is their responsibility to insure that voir 
dire proceedings not only provide adequate information for the 
informed exercise of peremptory challenges, but also eliminate 
bias and prejudice from criminal trials. State v. James, 819 
P.2d 781, 797-798 (Utah 1991) . In James, the court directed the 
trial courts to go beyond the minimally adequate voir dire 
required by federal constitutional standards, to thoroughly 
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detect and probe juror biases to the best of their ability. Id. 
Utah's allegiance to the need for thorough voir dire in criminal 
cases has been strong and consistent. E.g. State v. Worthen, 765 
P.2d 839, 844-45 (Utah 1988); State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1058-
1061 (Utah 1984) . 
11
 [T] he fairness of a trial may depend on the right of 
counsel to ask voir dire questions designed to discover attitudes 
and biases, both conscious and subconscious, even though they 
'would not have supported a challenge for cause.' All that is 
necessary for a voir dire question to be appropriate is that it 
allow 'defense counsel to exercise peremptory challenges more 
intelligently.'" State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 845 (Utah 
1988) (citation omitted) . 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(1) (f) codifies the right to an 
impartial jury, and Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 18(e) (14) 
requires trial courts to conduct voir dire proceedings that are 
adequate to reveal juror bias. The rule provides that a juror 
should be removed for cause if the voir dire indicates "that a 
state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to 
the cause, or to either party, which will prevent him from acting 
impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of 
the party challenging[.]" 
Trial courts are granted broad discretion and carry a 
heavy responsibility in conducting voir dire in criminal cases. 
E.g. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 114 L.Ed.2d 493, 501-510 (1991); State 
v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 797-98 (Utah 1991). 
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B. THE VOIR DIRE IN THIS CASE WAS INADEQUATE. 
After the initial round of voir dire questions, the 
trial court held a hearing outside the jury's presence, wherein 
defense counsel asked the trial court to ask the jurors the 
following pre-submitted questions: 
27. If, after hearing the evidence, you 
came to the conclusion that the prosecution 
had not proven the guilt of the accused 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and you found that 
a majority of the jurors believed the 
defendant was guilty, would you change your 
verdict only because you were in the 
minority? 
28. Are there any of you who are not in 
such a fair and impartial state of mind that 
you would not be satisfied to have a juror 
possessing your mental state judge the 
evidence if you or your loved ones were on 
trial here? In other words, would you want 
someone with your state of mind sitting as a 
juror on a case if you were the defendant? 
(R. 709). The trial court declined to give instructions 27 and 
28, because the court
 4was of the opinion that it had already 
conducted sufficient voir dire on those questions (R. 710). 
Evaluating the "totality of the questioning," State v. 
Sherard, 818 P.2d 554, 558 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 
516 (Utah 1992), this Court can see that the trial court abused 
its discretion in failing to ask these two questions, because the 
voir dire never addressed whether the prospective jurors felt 
that they were generally fair and impartial, and whether they 
would maintain their independence in the deliberation process, or 
succumb to pressure from a majority. 
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Defense counsel also requested the trial court to ask 
pre-submitted question 10, which stated, 
10. Have any of you see [n] any recent 
television programs, or received other 
information, depicting attempted adoptions? 
What did you hear? 
Counsel for Mr. Vigil informed the court that two television 
programs concerning attempted or failed adoptions had aired 
approximately one month and one week prior to the trial (R. 710). 
He asked the court to ask the jurors about their exposure to the 
programs, and the court agreed to do so (R. 709, 710). 
Prospective juror Pepper had seen a program during the week prior 
to trial (R. 715). The trial court asked him no follow up 
questions, but he had already been stricken for cause. 
Prospective juror Jerman had seen a show that winter 
(R. 716). When the court asked Jerman if that exposure to that 
information would prevent him from being fair and impartial, Mr. 
Jerman said that it would not (R. 716). Mr. Jerman had already 
been stricken for cause. 
Prospective juror Wylie had seen a program somewhere 
within six months prior to trial, and had read a magazine article 
about the subject (R. 715). Their colloquy was as follows: 
THE COURT: Let me ask you this question, 
Ms. Wylie. As a result of the documentary or 
the article in the magazine, and considering 
the nature of today's case, would any of that 
information interfere with your 
responsibility to be fair and impartial? 
MS. WYLIE: No, not really. 
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THE COURT: You are certain you could 
remain fair and impartial to both sides of 
this case? 
MS. WYLIE: I think, yes. 
THE COURT: Obviously, you use the word 
"think." Do you have a hesitation? 
MS. WYLIE: I don't remember the story in 
that detail, you know. I think I can listen 
impartially. 
(R. 715-716) . 
Prospective juror Reese said that she had seen a show 
called "Attempted Adoption," wherein a "child was up for adoption 
and then their minds were changed and the natural parents got the 
child back." (R. 717). She answered "No," when the court asked, 
"Would any of that information interfere with your abilities to 
be fair and impartial to both sides of this lawsuit?" (R. 717). 
At an unrecorded bench conference prior to the parties' 
passing of the jurors for cause, defense counsel objected to the 
trial court's refusal to further interview jurors Wylie and Reese 
in chambers regarding what television programs they had seen and 
how they felt about them (R. 718, 725). Both Reese and Wylie 
served on the Vigils' jury (R. 719) .x The trial court opined 
that the totality of the questions to all prospective jurors was 
adequate (R. 726). 
Trial counsel was correct in requesting further voir 
dire of the jurors. In State v. Boyatt, 854 P.2d 550 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, 862 P.2d 1356 (1993), a case wherein the 
1
 Trial counsel was under no obligation to remove them in 
order to preserve this issue. It was sufficient to request 
additional voir dire, and to obtain a ruling. State v. 
Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201, 204 n.l (Utah App. 1992). 
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potential jurors had been victims of crimes similar to those at 
issue, this Court stated, "[T] he trial court must adequately 
probe a juror's potential bias when that juror's responses or 
other facts suggest a potential bias. The trial court does not 
abuse its discretion when, after sufficient questioning, the 
suggestion of bias has been dispelled." id. at 552. This 
rationale applies equally well in the context of this case, 
wherein two of the prospective jurors had consumed media which 
may have biased them. 
This Court has recognized the need for specific voir 
dire of prospective jurors who have been exposed to similar media 
in the civil arena. In Doe v. Hafen, cert, granted 789 P.2d 33 
(Utah 1989), in Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96 (Utah App. 
1993); and in Evans v. Doty. 824 P.2d 460 (Utah App.), cert. 
denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1991). This Court has explained that 
once preliminary questioning establishes that jurors have been 
exposed to "tort reform propaganda," or media focusing on 
insurance reforms, prejudice is established, and the parties are 
entitled to more specific questioning to determine if jurors bear 
latent or deep-rooted biases as a result of their exposure. 
Hafen, 772 P.2d at 458-459; Barrett, 868 P.2d at 99-101; Evans, 
824 P.2d at 464-46. Given the interests at stake in a criminal 
case, trial courts should be required to provide at least as much 
voir dire as they are required to provide in the civil arena. 
See Hafen at 458 n.2 (intimating that the scope of voir dire in 
criminal cases might exceed the scope of civil trial voir dire in 
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order to safeguard the constitutional rights of criminal 
defendants). 
Given that the trial court already knew that two of the 
prospective jurors had been exposed to programs focusing on facts 
parallel to those involved in the instant case, which the jurors 
remembered to some degree, under Hafen, Barrett, and Evans, 
prejudice was established and the trial court should have asked 
more specific questions to determine if the prospective jurors 
bore latent or deep-rooted biases regarding the issues in the 
case. See id. 
The trial court's perfunctory questions to prospective 
jurors Reese and Wylie about whether, in light of the media 
exposure, they felt that they could be fair and impartial to both 
sides of the case, were inadequate. Juror Wylie never gave an 
unequivocal response to the trial court's question, but even if 
she had, the trial court should have asked more meaningful 
questions so that the court and counsel could have assessed the 
impact of the media on Ms. Wylie and Ms. Reese. 
Utah law has long recognized that trial courts may not 
simply accept a juror's assessment of his or her ability to try a 
case fairly; where preliminary voir dire raises a question about 
the juror's ability to serve, it is incumbent upon the trial 
court to ask probing questions to determine if the juror bears 
latent biases which would impair the juror's performance. See 
State v. Woollev, 810 P.2d 440, 441 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 
826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991)(when prospective juror has been a victim 
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of a crime similar to that at issue in the case, an inference of 
bias arises, which is not rebutted by a juror's claim that he can 
be fair and impartial). See also State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473, 
475 (Utah 1987); State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 25-27 (Utah 1984); 
State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 884 (Utah 1981); Jenkins v. 
Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, 536 (Utah 1981). 
As the Court stated in Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460 
(Utah App, 1991), fI[I]t is not enough for a trial judge to ask 
questions merely to discover a potential juror's overt biases. 
The judge must also allow counsel the opportunity to hear 
responses to questions that may indicate hidden or subconscious 
attitudes. Without such an opportunity, the prospect of 
impaneling a fair and impartial jury is diminished." Id. at 462. 
Reviewing the totality of the questioning, this Court 
can see that trial counsel was not afforded adequate information 
to assess the prospective jurors. Because the trial court thus 
abused its discretion in conducting the voir dire, a new trial is 
in order. See State v. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201, 205 (Utah App. 
1992) . 
II. THE ERRONEOUS JURY INSTRUCTION REQUIRES A NEW 
TRIAL. 
A. TRIAL COURTS MUST INSTRUCT JURIES CORRECTLY. 
The law governing jury instructions is that "beyond the 
substantive scope, correctness and clarity of the jury 
instructions, their precise wording and specificity is left to 
the sound discretion of the trial court.' However, said 
instructions must not incorrectly or misleadingly state material 
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rules of law." State v. Sherard, 818 P.2d 554, 560 (Utah 
App.)(citation omitted), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING MR. VIGIL'S 
JURY. 
Trial counsel objected to the portion emphasized below 
in the trial court's jury Instruction No. 28 (R. 1170), which 
provides, 
INSTRUCTION NO. 28 
Under Utah law, any person, agency, or 
corporation may pay maternity expenses, 
related medical or hospital, and necessary 
living expenses of the mother preceding and 
during confinement. However, that act of 
paying is by law considered an act of charity 
and may not be made for the purpose of 
inducing the mother, parent or legal guardian 
to place the child for adoption, consent to 
an adoption, or cooperate in the completion 
of an adoption. 
Whether a person consents to the 
adoption of his or her child is a personal 
and private act of that person and may not be 
bought or bartered for under the law. A 
natural parent at any time may choose not to 
consent to an adoption. By so choosing, that 
person does not subject himself or herself to 
criminal responsibility unless you find from 
the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt 
each and every element of the offense of 
Theft by Deception, as charged in the 
Informations have been established. 
(Emphasis added). 
The problem with the emphasized portion of Instruction 
No. 28 is that is purports to carve out a theft by deception 
exception from the statute which mandates that all monies given 
to birth mothers are charitable contributions. Utah Code Ann. § 
76-7-203 states in relevant part: 
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Any person, while having custody, care, 
control, or possession of any child, who 
sells, or disposes of, or attempts to sell or 
dispose of, any child for and in 
consideration of the payment of money or 
other thing of value is guilty of a felony of 
the third degree. However, this section does 
not prohibit any person, agency, or 
corporation from paying the actual and 
reasonable legal expenses, maternity 
expenses, related medical or hospital, and 
necessary living expenses of the mother 
preceding and during confinement as an act of 
charity, so long as payment is not made for 
the purpose of inducing the mother, parent, 
or legal guardian to place the child for 
adoption, consent to an adoption, or 
cooperate in the completion of an adoption. 
There can be no theft by deception in the context of an 
adoption, because the property at issue is given to the birth 
mother as a charitable contribution, and not as consideration for 
her promised performance to consent to the adoption. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-7-203. 
Reliance is an essential element of theft by deception. 
State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263 (Utah 1982). Even if the parties 
were deceived, there was no theft by deception unless the parties 
relied on the Vigils' statements in parting with their money. 
Id. Because the birth parents' consent cannot be bought under 
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-7-203, in giving the birth parents money, the 
prospective adoptive parents legally could not rely on the Vigils 
to consent to the adoption. Because the money furnished to birth 
parents is characterized as a charitable donation, by definition, 
those parting with the money could not be relying on the 
receivers to perform. 
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The birth parents cannot purvey any deception, because 
the object of their representations, the baby, cannot be sold, 
and thus has no pecuniary significance. See Utah Code Ann. §76-
6-405(2) ("Theft by deception does not occur, however, when there 
is only falsity as to matters having no pecuniary 
significance[.]"). 
Any birth parent aware of Utah Code Ann.§ 76-7-203 
would have a defense to a charge of theft by deception under Utah 
Code Ann.§ 76-6-402(3), which provides, "It is a defense under 
this part that the actor: (a) Acted under an honest claim of 
right to the property or service involved; or (b) Acted in the 
honest belief that he had the right to obtain or exercise control 
over the property or service as he did[.]" 
Under the plain language of Utah law as it currently 
stands, the conduct at issue here does not constitute theft by 
deception. In the event that the legislature wishes to make 
conduct similar to that alleged here a crime, it may do so by 
adopting a statute which makes it a crime to accept charitable 
contributions if there is no intent to complete the adoption at 
the time of accepting the contributions. In grafting a theft by 
deception exception onto the charitable donation statute, the 
trial court invaded the province of the legislature, and violated 
the doctrine of separation of powers. See generally Sutherland, 
Statutory Construction, section 46.03 (citations omitted); 
Constitution of Utah, Article V Section 1 (separation of powers 
provision). 
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As trial counsel correctly noted, the last sentence of 
Jury Instruction No. 28 is inconsistent with the law governing 
theft by deception, and the court erred in giving it to the 
jury.2 The instruction is the crux of the State's case, and the 
jury's receipt of it was necessarily prejudicial to Mr. Vigil. 
III. MR. VIGIL SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO PRESENT HIS DEFENSE 
IN A NEW TRIAL. 
A. TRIAL COURTS MUST ALLOW THE PRESENTATION OF 
DEFENSE EVIDENCE. 
Every criminal defendant has several federal 
constitutional rights to present a complete defense to criminal 
charges against him. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 
(1985)("Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, or in the Compulsory Process or 
Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution 
guarantees criminal defendants 'a meaningful opportunity to 
present a complete defense.' ... We break no new ground in 
2
 Trial counsel's objection should be adequate to 
preserve this issue for appeal. To the extent that trial counsel 
failed to marshall all of the law pertinent to his objection, 
however, this Court nonetheless should address the issue fully, 
and may do so under the plain error and ineffective assistance of 
counsel doctrines. The law governing this issue should have been 
plain to both the trial court, and the failure to apply the law 
in Mr. Vigil's behalf was clearly prejudicial. Trial counsel's 
performance in failing to assert the law constituted objectively 
deficient performance, and there is a reasonable likelihood that 
the result would have been different had trial counsel properly 
asserted the law on his client's behalf. See generally State v. 
Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah)(discussing plain error doctrine), 
cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989); State v. Brooks, 868 P.2d 818, 
822 (Utah App.)(discussing common standard for reversal on 
allegations of plain error and ineffective assistance of 
counsel), cert, granted, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994); discussed 
infra. 
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observing that an essential component of procedural fairness is 
an opportunity to be heard.")(citations omitted). The 
Constitution of Utah provides parallel protection. An essential 
of due process provided by Article I Section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution is the "fair opportunity to submit evidence." 
Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 317 (Utah 1945). " [T]he 
defendant's right to present all competent evidence in his 
defense is a right guaranteed by the due process clause of our 
State Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 7 [.]" State v. Harding, 635 
P.2d 33, 34 (Utah 1981). Article I Section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution provides numerous trial rights which also pertain. 
It states, 
In criminal prosecutions the accused 
shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel, to demand the nature 
and cause of the accusation against him, to 
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses 
against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own 
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases. 
(Emphasis added). 
B. TRIAL COURTS MUST INSTRUCT THE JURY ON DEFENSE 
THEORIES. 
In selecting instructions for the jury, trial courts 
are governed by the axiom that "the defendant has a right to have 
his or her theory of the case presented to the jury in a clear 
and comprehensible manner." State v. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201, 
205 (Utah App. 1992) (citation omitted) . 
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C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING MR. VIGIL'S DEFENSE 
EVIDENCE. 
Trial counsel for Mr. Vigil called Roland Oliver to 
testify about services offered by adoption agencies. Upon the 
state's objection to the relevance of his testimony, trial 
counsel argued that the evidence was relevant because, had the 
Vigils gone through adoption agencies, rather than through 
attorneys Bushman and Giffen, who provided inadequate services, 
the Vigils would not have proceeded as they did, in continuing to 
seek out prospecting adoptive couples, and accepting expense 
monies from three different couples. The trial court sustained 
the relevance objection, and also excluded the evidence under 
Rule 403, finding that its admission might confuse and mislead 
the jury. (R. 1151-1158). 
In this ruling, the trial court forbade Mr. Vigil from 
presenting his defense to the crime at issue, and violated the 
aforementioned tenets of constitutional law. The constitutional 
provisions prevail, regardless of the rules of evidence 
underpinning the trial court's decision. United States 
Constitution, Article VI (supremacy clause); Constitution of 
Utah, Article I Section 26 (provisions of Utah Constitution are 
mandatory and prohibitory, unless expressly declared otherwise). 
The trial court's ruling was also erroneous under the rules of 
evidence. 
Utah Rules of Evidence 4 02 provides for the admission 
of " [a]11 relevant evidence ... except as otherwise provided by 
the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the 
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State of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by other rules 
applicable in courts of this state. ..." Relevant evidence is 
defined by Utah Rules of Evidence 401, as "evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence 
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence." 
Mr. Vigil's evidence regarding how adoptions should 
normally be conducted, in contrast to the performance of 
attorneys Bushman and Giffen, goes directly to the absence of the 
Vigils' intent to deceive anyone or to wrongfully deprive them of 
their property. By explaining proper adoption procedures through 
Mr. Oliver, Mr. Vigil sought to demonstrate that the Vigils' 
behavior was caused by the inadequate performance of attorneys 
Bushman and Giffen, rather than motivated by any intent to 
deceive. 
The trial court's exclusion order was also based on 
Utah Rules of Evidence 403, which provides, 
Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Utah law interpreting this rule demonstrates the error of the 
trial court's reasoning. 
Under Utah Rules of Evidence 403, courts are to presume 
that relevant evidence is admissible unless the evidence at issue 
falls within a class of evidence known to have "an unusual 
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propensity to unfairly prejudice, inflame or mislead the jury." 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1221-22 (Utah 1993). In the event 
that the evidence fell within such a class, the proponent of the 
evidence would then have the burden to show the unusual probative 
value of the evidence. Id. 
The evidence which Mr. Vigil sought to introduce would 
not have an unusual propensity to "unfairly prejudice, inflame or 
mislead the jury," and its admission should be presumed. 
Assuming that the burden were on Mr. Vigil to 
demonstrate the unusual probative value of the evidence, the 
burden would be met in this case. The State's proof of deception 
hinged on the fact that there were multiple prospective couples 
involved. The prosecutor told the jury that had there been only 
one couple who tried to adopt the Vigil's baby, the State would 
not have prosecuted the Vigils (R. 1175; 13 08). The basic theory 
of the defense was that it was the inadequate performance of 
attorneys Giffen and Bushman, rather than an intent to deceive 
the three couples, that motivated the Vigils to become involved 
with multiple prospective adopting couples (R. 1297-1301) . 
There was evidence presented regarding the inadequacies 
of the services provided by Giffen and Bushman. However, the 
vast majority of this evidence required legal training to 
appreciate. Mr. Giffin vacillated in his testimony regarding 
whether he represented the Vigils or the adoptive couples (R. 
929; 941; Defendant's Exhibit 9). Mr. Bushman was initially 
contacted to find an adoptive family, but he negotiated to adopt 
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the Vigil baby himself, and also presented documents authorizing 
him to find another couple to adopt the baby, and negotiated with 
another couple to adopt the Vigil baby (R. 756-762; 772-783; 
792). Both attorneys had the Vigils sign vague forms purporting 
to waive conflicts of interest. (Defendant's Exhibit 10; State's 
Exhibit 3). Mr. Bushman provided support money for the Vigils 
out of his attorney trust account, and drafted an agreement 
whereby the Vigils would have to return the funds if they did not 
consent to the adoption, despite the law that the money, by law, 
was to be a charitable contribution (R. 779-780). Mr. Bushman, 
who advertised himself as an adoption attorney, indicated that 
the idea that the money to the birth parents was a charitable 
contribution was "preposterous to [his] mind." (R. 769-770). Mr. 
Giffen acknowledged having had difficulties with the Vigils, 
stemming from the way in which he was dispensing the funds, and 
because his assistant failed to obtain timely medical care for 
Mrs. Vigil when she had a yeast infection. (R. 938-939; 954). 
Had the jurors been allowed to hear about proper 
adoption procedures from Roland Oliver, this would have clarified 
the deficiencies in the attorneys' performances, which the jurors 
may not have appreciated, given their lack of legal training. 
The evidence would have supported the Vigils' defense that their 
motivation in seeking out successive couples was a lack of 
satisfaction with the attorneys, rather than a desire to deceive 
the prospective couples into parting with their money. 
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The trial court's concerns that the evidence might 
confuse or mislead the jury underestimate the intelligence of 
juries and the importance of giving the jury the information 
relevant to deciding the facts in issue. Juries routinely 
address questions of intent and other issues of far greater 
complexity than is raised by Roland Oliver's testimony. 
Reference to State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922 (Utah App. 
1994), demonstrates the error in the trial court's analysis. 
Teuscher was charged with homicide for the death of a child which 
occurred while the child was in Teuscher's day care facility. At 
trial, her attorney sought to exclude evidence of other uncharged 
instances of child abuse involving Teuscher and other children on 
other occasions. The trial court held, and this Court agreed, 
that under Utah Rules of Evidence 404(b), proof of the other 
crimes was entirely appropriate, inasmuch as the homicide charge 
to be determined by the jury required the jury's assessment of 
issues such as intent, absence of mistake and identity of the 
perpetrator. Jd. at 926-927. 
The Teuscher trial court held and this Court agreed 
that the evidence was also admissible under rule 403. While 
evidence of uncharged crimes is normally considered to be 
presumptively prejudicial, State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 741 
(Utah 1985), both Courts found that the probative value of the 
testimony outweighed the danger of prejudice, given the issues to 
be determined by the jury. Teuscher at 928. 
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The evidence at issue in Teuscher had a far greater 
danger of misleading or confusing the jury than did Mr. Oliver's 
testimony in this case. Unlike the prosecution in Teuscher, Mr. 
Vigil has constitutional rights to present his defense, so the 
admission of his evidence is more strongly required than that in 
Teuscher. 
Cross-examination of the state's witnesses was 
inadequate to present the defense because Mr. Oliver's testimony 
went beyond the proper scope of cross-examination of those 
witnesses, and because Mr. Vigil has the right to call witnesses 
to support his defense. Cf. State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 
1990)(conviction reversed for ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel in part because counsel failed to call witnesses to 
bolster the defendant's testimony). 
Because Roland Oliver's testimony was relevant, and 
because its probative value exceeded its prejudicial effect, the 
trial court should have admitted the evidence. While cross-
examination of the State's witnesses did present evidence of the 
attorneys' shortcomings, a lay jury likely would not appreciate 
the significance of the evidence centering on legal 
technicalities, such as conflicts of interest. Given the 
scarcity of other evidence available to establish the Vigils' 
defense to the intent element of the charges, the trial court's 
order excluding Roland Oliver's testimony was prejudicial.3 
3
 Trial counsel's efforts to present the evidence should 
be adequate to preserve this issue for appeal. To the extent 
that trial counsel failed to marshall all of the law pertinent to 
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D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE MR. 
VIGIL'S DEFENSE INSTRUCTIONS. 
Over trial counsel's objection, the trial court refused 
to give the jury requested defense Instruction Nos. 8 and 9, 
which quote portions of Rules 1.7 and 1.8 of the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct (R. 1169). The requested instructions were 
as follow: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a 
client if the representation of that client 
will be directly adverse to another client, 
unless: 
(1) the lawyer reasonably 
believes the representation will 
not adversely affect the 
relationship with the other client; 
and 
(2) each client consents after 
consultation. 
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a 
client if the representation of that client 
may be materially limited by the lawyer's 
responsibilities to another client or to a 
third person, or by the lawyer's own 
interests, unless: 
(1) the lawyer reasonably 
believes the representation will 
not be adversely affected; and 
the issue, however, this Court nonetheless should address the 
issue fully, and may do so under the plain error and ineffective 
assistance of counsel doctrines. The law governing this issue 
should have been plain to the trial court, and the failure to 
apply the law in Mr. Vigil's behalf was clearly prejudicial. 
Trial counsel's performance in failing to assert the law 
constituted objectively deficient performance, and there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the result would have been different 
had trial counsel properly asserted the law on his client's 
behalf. See generally State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 
(Utah)(discussing plain error doctrine), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 
62 (1989); State v. Brooks, 868 P.2d 818, 822 (Utah 
App.)(discussing common standard for reversal on allegations of 
plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel), cert. 
granted, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994); discussed infra. 
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(R. 295) 
(2) the client consents after 
consultation. When representation 
of multiple clients in a single 
matter is undertaken, the 
consultation shall include 
explanation of the implications of 
the common representation and the 
advantages and risks involved. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a 
business transaction with a client or 
knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, 
security or other pecuniary interest adverse 
to a client unless: 
(1) the transaction and terms 
on which the lawyer acquires the 
interest are fair and reasonable to 
the client and are fully disclosed 
and transmitted in writing to the 
client in a manner which can be 
reasonably understood by the 
client[;] 
(2) the client is given a 
reasonable opportunity to seek the 
advi[c]e of independent counsel in 
the transaction[;] and 
(3) the client consents in 
writing thereto. 
(R. 296) 
As was discussed above, Mr. Vigil was entitled to have 
the jury instructed on his theory of the defense. Requested 
Instructions No. 8 and 9 would have assisted defense counsel in 
elucidating the shortcomings in the performances of the attorneys 
Giffen and Bushman, and thus in explaining why the Vigils sought 
out successive prospective adoptive couples. Particularly in 
light of the trial court's refusal to allow the testimony of 
Roland Oliver to explain acceptable norms in adoption 
proceedings, the absence of the requested jury instructions 
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pertaining to the attorneys' deficient performances was 
prejudicial. 
IV. THE ABSENCE OF PROPER DEFENSE INSTRUCTIONS 
REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON 
TWO ASPECTS OF MR. VIGIL'S DEFENSE. 
Given that Utah law mandates that monies given to birth 
parents by prospective adoptive parents are to be charitable 
contributions or gifts, and that attorneys John Giffen and 
Marilyn Fineshriber advised the Vigils that the money from the 
prospective adoptive couples was legally considered to be a 
charitable contribution, the Vigils were entitled to an 
instruction embodying the law set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
4 02. It provides, in relevant part, 
.... (3) It is a defense under this part that 
the actor: 
(a) Acted under an honest 
claim of right to the property or 
service involved; or 
(b) Acted in the honest belief 
that he had the right to obtain or 
exercise control over the property 
or service as he did; or 
(c) Obtained or exercised 
control over the property or 
service honestly believing that the 
owner, if present, would have 
consented. 
While John Giffen testified that he told the Vigils 
that it was illegal to accept money from more than one couple, 
this discussion occurred in the context of their going over a 
form embodying California Law. See State's Exhibit 10. Mr. 
Giffen testified that he told the Vigils that Utah law was 
similar to California's. Mrs. Vigil denied the Vigils' ever 
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discussing any such legal concept with Mr. Giffen, and Mr. Vigil 
did not testify at all. 
The jury also should have been instructed that 
"Theft by deception does not occur ... when there is only falsity 
as to matters having no pecuniary significance[.]" Utah Code 
Arm.§ 76-6-405(2) . 
It was the state's theory that the Vigils deceived the 
Bushmans, the Hallidays, and the Elizondos in falsely 
representing their intent to give up the Vigils' baby for 
adoption (R. 7-8; 171-172). For instance, the probable cause 
statement originally filed in case number 931901605 provides, in 
relevant part, "The Defendants received money from three 
different couples for the baby and yet never delivered the child 
to anyone." (R. 172). As a matter of law, these representations 
could have no pecuniary significance. Utah Code Ann.§ 76-7-203. 
B. THIS COURT SHOULD ADDRESS THE ERRORS. 
While trial counsel did not request the defense 
instructions, this Court should nonetheless address and rectify 
the errors, under the plain error and ineffective assistance of 
counsel doctrines. 
Under the plain error doctrine, it is appropriate for 
an appellate court to address an issue raised for the first time 
on appeal if the error should have been obvious to the trial 
court and was prejudicial. State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 
(Utah), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989). Some errors will be 
addressed on appeal even if they should not have been plain to 
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the trial court, if, in hindsight, the appellate Court recognizes 
a high level of prejudice stemming from the error. Id., 773 P.2d 
at 35 and n.8. The plain error standard is not to be applied in 
an overly technical fashion; the rule is designed to balance the 
need for procedural regularity against the need for fairness. 
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 n.12 (Utah 1989). 
The two statutes at issue here should have been plain 
to the trial court. The statute limiting theft by deception to 
representations of pecuniary significance is the same statute 
which defines theft by deception. The statute setting forth the 
good faith defenses to the charges is located under the same part 
of the code as the theft by deception statute. The language of 
the statutes is plain and unambiguous, and directly supports the 
defense that both attorneys for the Vigils were attempting to 
assert through motions to quash the bindovers, motions to 
dismiss, and arguments to the jury. 
The absence of the defense instructions was 
prejudicial. There were no true defense instructions given, and 
given the evidence in this case, there is a substantial 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome, had the proper 
instructions been given. 
This Court should therefore address the absence of the 
instructions under the plain error doctrine. See State v. 
Brooks, 868 P.2d 818, 822 (Utah App.)(discussing common standard 
for reversal on allegations of plain error and ineffective 
assistance of counsel), cert, granted, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994). 
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"In order to bring a successful ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim pursuant to the 
Sixth Amendment, a defendant must show [1] 
that trial counsel's performance was 
deficient in that it 'fell below an objective 
standard or reasonableness,' and [2] that the 
deficient performance prejudiced the outcome 
of the trial." 
State v. Brooks, 868 P.2d 818, 822 (Utah App.)(citations 
omitted), cert, granted, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994). The 
prejudice prong is established if there is a "'reasonable 
probability' that, but for counsel's errors, the result would 
have been different." Salt Lake City v. Grotepas, 874 P.2d 136, 
138 (Utah App. 1994)(citation omitted). 
In considering a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel on direct appeal, the trial record must be sufficient for 
the court to decide the issue, and the defendant must be 
represented by counsel different from trial counsel. Id. at 822 
n4. 
Just as the need for the defense instructions should 
have been obvious to the trial court, the need also should have 
been obvious to trial counsel. The failure to request the 
instructions cannot be based upon any conceivable tactical 
decision, and fell below objective standards of reasonableness. 
Given the absence of any true defense instructions, and given the 
evidence in this case, trial counsel's failure to request the 
instructions was also prejudicial. See State v. Moritzkyf 771 
P.2d 688, 692 (Utah App. 1989) (conviction reversed for 
ineffective assistance of counsel, who requested defense 
instruction that failed to incorporate recent statute beneficial 
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to the defense; court found no conceivable tactical basis for the 
omission); Salt Lake City v. Grotepas, 874 P.2d 136 (Utah App. 
1994)(conviction reversed because trial counsel failed to request 
defense instruction authorized by the code). 
V. AS A MATTER OF LAW, CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS 
CANNOT BE THE OBJECT OF THEFT BY DECEPTION. 
As trial counsel argued this to the trial court (e.g. 
R. 1052-1053), charitable contributions may not be the object of 
theft by deception.4 
Theft by deception is defined by Utah Code Ann.§ 76-6-
405, which states, 
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains 
or exercises control over property of another 
by deception and with a purpose to deprive 
him thereof. 
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, 
however, when there is only falsity as to 
matters having no pecuniary significance, or 
puffing by statements unlikely to deceive 
ordinary persons in the group addressed. 
"Puffing" means an exaggerated commendation 
4
 Trial counsel's motions to quash the bindover orders 
and to dismiss the case should be adequate to preserve this issue 
for appeal. To the extent that trial counsel failed to marshall 
all of the law pertinent to the issue, however, this Court should 
nonetheless address the issue fully, and may do so under the 
plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel doctrines. The 
law governing this issue should have been plain to the trial 
court, and the failure to apply the law in Mr. Vigil's behalf was 
clearly prejudicial. Trial counsel's performance in failing to 
assert the law constituted objectively deficient performance, and 
there is a reasonable likelihood that the result would have been 
different had trial counsel properly asserted the law on his 
client's behalf. See generally State v. Eldredae, 773 P.2d 29 
(Utah)(discussing plain error doctrine), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 
62 (1989); State v. Brooks, 868 P.2d 818, 822 (Utah 
App.)(discussing common standard for reversal on allegations of 
plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel), cert. 
granted, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994); discussed supra. 
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of wares or worth in communications addressed 
to the public or to a class or group. 
By the plain language of the statute, theft by 
deception does not occur when the matters which are the subject 
of the deception have no pecuniary significance. Under Utah Code 
Ann.§ 76-7-203, consent to adopt can have no pecuniary 
significance. The statute states, 
Any person, while having custody, care, 
control, or possession of any child, who 
sells, or disposes of, or attempts to sell or 
dispose of, any child for and in 
consideration of the payment of money or 
other thing of value is guilty of a felony of 
the third degree. However, this section does 
not prohibit any person, agency, or 
corporation from paying the actual and 
reasonable legal expenses, maternity 
expenses, related medical or hospital, and 
necessary living expenses of the mother 
preceding and during confinement as an act of 
charity, so long as payment is not made for 
the purpose of inducing the mother, parent, 
or legal guardian to place the child for 
adoption, consent to an adoption, or 
cooperate in the completion of an adoption. 
An element of the offense of theft by deception is 
reliance by the victims. State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263 (Utah 
1982). Because the victims in the context of an adoption cannot 
rely on the birth parents to consent to the adoption, Utah Code 
Ann.§ 76-7-203, their is no reliance causing them to part with 
their money, and theft by deception cannot occur. Jones. 
The statute characterizing monies from prospective 
adoptive parents as charitable contributions, Utah Code Ann. §76-
7-203, would also provide a basis for the statutory good faith 
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defenses to theft by deception provided in Utah Code Ann.§ 76-6-
4 02(3). That statute provides, 
(3) It is a defense under this part that 
the actor: 
(a) Acted under an honest 
claim of right to the property or 
service involved; or 
(b) Acted in the honest belief 
that he had the right to obtain or 
exercise control over the property 
or service as he did; or 
(c) Obtained or exercised 
control over the property or 
service honestly believing that the 
owner, if present, would have 
consented. 
Because the facts at issue here cannot constitute the 
crime of theft by deception under Utah law, this Court should 
order this case dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Vigil requests that this case be dismissed. In the 
alternative, he seeks a new trial, wherein the voir dire is 
adequate, the jury is instructed properly, and he is allowed to 
present his full defense. 
PATRICK L. ANDERSON 
Attorney for Mr. Vigil 
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ADDENDUM 1 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Constitution of Utah, Article I Section 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I Section 10 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall 
remain inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, 
except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight 
jurors. In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury 
shall consist of four jurors. In criminal cases the 
verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-
fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in 
civil cases shall be waived unless demanded. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I Section 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have 
the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to 
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of 
the county or district in which the offense is alleged 
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before 
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees 
to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, 
nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the 
same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a 
preliminary examination, the function of the 
examination is limited to determining whether probable 
cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute. 
Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of 
reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule 
in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding 
with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate 
discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I Section 26 
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory 
and prohibitory, unless by express words they are 
declared to be otherwise. 
Constitution of Utah, Article V Section 1 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah 
shall be divided into three distinct departments, the 
Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no 
person charged with the exercise of powers properly 
belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise 
any functions appertaining to either of the others, 
except in the cases herein expressly directed or 
permitted. 
United States Constitution, Amendment V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, 
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or 
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for his 
defence. 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of the 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
United States Constitution, Article VI 
All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, 
before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as 
valid against the United States under this 
Constitution, as under the Confederation. 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and 
all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby, any Thing in the constitution of Laws of 
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, 
and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and 
all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United 
States and of the several States, shall be bound by 
Oath or affirmation to support this Constitution; but 
no religious Test shall ever be required as a 
qualification to any Office or public Trust under the 
United States. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-6-401 
For the purposes of this part: 
(1) "Property" means anything of value, including 
real estate, tangible and intangible personal property, 
captured or domestic animals and birds, written 
instruments or other writings representing or embodying 
rights concerning real or personal property, labor, 
services, or otherwise containing anything of value to 
the owner, commodities of a public utility nature such 
as telecommunications, gas, electricity, steam, or 
water, and trade secrets, meaning the whole or any 
portion of any scientific or technical information, 
design, process, procedure, formula or invention which 
the owner thereof intends to be available only to 
persons selected by him. 
(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to property, to 
bring about a transfer of possession or of some other 
legally recognized interest in property, whether to the 
obtainer or another, in relation to labor or services, 
to secure performance thereof; and in relation to a 
trade secret to make any facsimile, replica, 
photograph, or other reproduction. 
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the 
conscious obj ect: 
(a) To withhold property permanently or 
for so extended a period or to use under such 
circumstances that a substantial portion of 
its economic value, or of the use and benefit 
thereof, would be lost; or 
(b) To restore the property only upon 
payment of a reward or other compensation; or 
(c) To dispose of the property under 
circumstances that make it unlikely that the 
owner will recover it. 
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" 
means, but is not necessarily limited to, conduct 
heretofore defined or known as common-law larceny by 
trespassory taking, larceny be conversion, larceny by 
bailee, and embezzlement. 
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person 
intentionally: 
(a) Creates or confirms by words or 
conduct an impression of law or fact that is 
false and that the actor does not believe to 
be true and that is likely to affect the 
judgment of another in the transaction; or 
(b) Fails to correct a false impression 
of law or fact that the actor previously 
created or confirmed by words or conduct that 
is likely to affect the judgment of another 
and that the actor does not now believe to be 
true; or 
(c) Prevents another from acquiring 
information likely to affect his judgment in 
the transaction; or 
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or 
encumbers property without disclosing a lien, 
security interest, adverse claim, or other 
legal impediment to the enjoyment of the 
property, whether the lien, security 
interest, claim or impediment is or is not 
valid or is or is not a matter of official 
record; or 
(e) Promises performance that is likely 
to affect the judgment of another in the 
transaction, which performance the actor does 
not intend to perform or knows will not be 
performed; provided, however, that failure to 
perform the promise in issue without other 
evidence of intent or knowledge is not 
sufficient proof that the actor did not 
intend to perform or knew the promise would 
not be performed. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-6-402 
The following presumption shall be applicable to 
this part: 
(1) Possession of property recently stolen when no 
satisfactory explanation of such possession is made, 
shall be deemed prima facie evidence that the person in 
possession stole the property. 
(2) It is no defense under this part, that the 
actor has an interest in the property or service stolen 
if another person also has an interest that the actor 
is not entitled to infringe, provided an interest in 
property for purposes of this subsection shall not 
include a security interest for the repayment of a debt 
or obligation. 
(3) It is a defense under this part that the 
actor: 
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right 
to the property or service involved; or 
.(b) Acted in the honest belief that he 
had the right to obtain or exercise control 
over the property or service as he did; or 
(c) Obtained or exercised control over 
the property or service honestly believing 
that the owner, if present, would have 
consented. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-6-405 
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or 
exercises control over property of another by deception 
and with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, however, 
when there is only falsity as to matters having no 
pecuniary significance, or puffing by statements 
unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group 
addressed. "Puffing" means an exaggerated commendation 
of wares or worth in communications addressed to the 
public or to a class or group. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-7-203 
Any person, while having custody, care, control, 
or possession of any child, who sells, or disposes of, 
or attempts to sell or dispose of, any child for and in 
consideration of the payment of money or other thing of 
value is guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
However, this section does not prohibit any person, 
agency, or corporation from paying the actual and 
reasonable legal expenses, maternity expenses, related 
medical or hospital, and necessary living expenses of 
the mother preceding and during confinement as an act 
of charity, so long as payment is not made for the 
purpose of inducing the mother, parent, or legal 
guardian to place the child for adoption, consent to an 
adoption, or cooperate in the completion of an 
adoption. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 77-1-6 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by 
counsel; 
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed 
against him; 
(c) To testify in his own behalf; 
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him; 
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the 
attendance of witnesses in his behalf; 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury 
of the county or district where the offense is alleged 
to have been committed; 
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and 
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with 
provisions of law, or be entitled to a trial within 30 
days after arraignment if unable to post bail and if 
the business of the court permits. 
(2) In addition: 
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for 
the same offense; 
(b) No accused person shall, before final 
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to 
secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or the 
laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when 
received; 
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence 
against himself; 
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband nor a husband against his wife; and 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict 
of a jury, or upon a plea of guilty or no contest, or 
upon a judgment of a court when trial by jury has ben 
waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by 
a magistrate. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18 
(a) The clerk shall draw by lot and call the 
number of the jurors that are to try the cause plus 
such an additional number as will allow for all 
peremptory challenges permitted. After each challenge 
for cause sustained, another juror shall be called to 
fill the vacancy before further challenges are made, 
and any such new juror may be challenged for cause. 
When the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk 
shall make a list of the jurors remaining, and each 
side, beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate 
thereon is peremptory challenge to one juror at a time 
in regular turn, as the court may direct, until all 
peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The 
clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many 
of them as shall be necessary to constitute the jury, 
in the order in which they appear on the list, and the 
persons whose names are so called shall constitute the 
jury. 
(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant 
to conduct the examination of the prospective jurors or 
may itself conduct the examination. In the latter 
event, the court may permit counsel or the defendant to 
supplement the examination by such further inquiry as 
it deems proper, or may itself submit to the 
prospective jurors additional questions requested by 
counsel or the defendant. 
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an 
individual juror. 
(1) The panel is a list of jurors called 
to serve at a particular court or for the 
trial of a particular action. A challenge to 
the panel is an objection made to all jurors 
summoned and may be taken by either party. 
(i) A challenge to the panel 
can be founded only on a material 
departure from the procedure 
prescribed with respect to the 
selection, drawing, summoning and 
return of the panel. 
(ii) The challenge to the 
panel shall be taken before the 
jury is sworn and shall be in 
writing or recorded by the 
reporter. It shall specifically 
set forth the facts constituting 
the grounds of the challenge. 
(iii) If a challenge to the 
panel is opposed by the adverse 
party, a hearing may be had to try 
any question of fact upon which the 
challenge is based. The jurors 
challenged, and any other persons, 
may be called as witnesses at the 
hearing thereon. 
(iv) The court shall decide 
the challenge. If the challenge to 
the panel is allowed, the court 
shall discharge the jury so far as 
the trial in question is concerned. 
If a challenge is denied, the court 
shall direct the selection of the 
jurors to proceed. 
(2) A challenge to an individual juror 
may be either peremptory or for cause. A 
challenge to an individual juror may be made 
only before the jury is sworn to try the 
action, except the court may, for good cause, 
permit it to be made after the juror is sworn 
but before any of the evidence is presented. 
In challenges for cause the rules relating to 
challenges to a panel and hearings thereon 
shall apply. All challenges for cause shall 
be taken first by the prosecution and then by 
the defense. 
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a 
juror for which no reason need be given. In capital 
cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory 
challenges. In other felony cases each side is entitled 
to four peremptory challenges. In misdemeanor cases, 
each side is entitled to three peremptory challenges. 
If there is more than one defendant the court may allow 
the defendants additional peremptory challenges and 
permit them to be exercised separately or jointly. 
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a 
particular juror and may be taken on one or more of the 
following grounds: 
(1) want of any of the 
qualifications prescribed by law; 
(2) any mental or physical infirmity 
which renders one incapable of performing the 
duties of a juror; 
(3) consanguinity or affinity within the 
fourth degree to the person alleged to be 
injured by the offense charged, or on whose 
complaint the prosecution was instituted; 
(4) the existence of any social, legal, 
business, fiduciary or other relationship 
between the prospective juror and any party, 
witness or person alleged to have been 
victimized or injured by the defendant, which 
relationship when viewed objectively, would 
suggest to reasonable minds that the 
prospective juror would be unable or 
unwilling to return a verdict which would be 
free of favoritism. A prospective juror 
shall not be disqualified solely because he 
is indebted or employed by the state or a 
political subdivision thereof; 
(5) having been or being the party 
adverse to the defendant in a civil action, 
or having complained against or having been 
accused by him in a criminal prosecution; 
(6) having served on the grand jury 
which found the indictment; 
(7) having served on a trial jury which 
has tried another person for the particular 
offense charged; 
(8) having been one of a jury formally 
sworn to try the same charge, and whose 
verdict was set aside, or which was 
discharged without a verdict after the case 
was submitted to it; 
(9) having served as a juror in a civil 
action brought against the defendant for the 
act charged as an offense; 
(10) if the offense charged is 
punishable with death, the entertaining of 
such conscientious opinions about the death 
penalty as would preclude the juror from 
voting to impose the death penalty following 
conviction regardless of the facts; 
(11) because he is or, within one year 
preceding, has been engaged or interested in 
carrying on any business, calling or 
employment, the carrying on of which is a 
violation of law, where defendant is charged 
with a like offense; 
(12) because he has been a witness, 
either for or against the defendant on the 
preliminary examination or before the grand 
jury; 
(13) having formed or expressed an 
unqualified opinion or belief as to whether 
the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the 
offense charged; 
(14) that a state of mind exists on the 
part of the juror with reference to the 
cause, or to either party, which will prevent 
him from acting impartially and without 
prejudice to the substantial rights of the 
party challenging; but no person shall be 
disqualified as a juror by reason of having 
formed or expressed an opinion upon the 
matter or cause to be submitted to such jury, 
founded upon public rumor, statements in 
public journals or common notoriety, if it 
satisfactorily appears to the court that the 
juror can and will, notwithstanding such 
opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the 
matter to be submitted to him. 
(f) peremptory challenges shall be taken first by 
the prosecution and then by the defense alternately. 
Challenges for cause shall be completed before 
peremptory challenges are taken. 
(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be 
impanelled. Alternate jurors, in the order in which 
they are called, shall replace jurors who are, or 
become, unable or disqualified to perform their duties. 
The prosecution and defense shall each have one 
additional peremptory challenge for each alternate 
juror to be chosen. 
Alternate jurors shall have the same 
qualifications, take the same oath and enjoy the same 
privileges as regular jurors. 
(h) A statutory exemption from service as a juror 
is a privilege of the person exempted and is not a 
ground for challenge for cause. 
(i) When the jury is selected an oath shall be 
administered to the jurors, in substance, that they and 
each of them will well and truly try the matter in 
issue between the parties, and render a true verdict 
according to the evidence and the instructions of the 
court. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 19 
(a) At the close of the evidence or at such 
earlier time as the court reasonably directs, any party 
may file written request that the court instruct the 
jury on the law as set forth in the request. At the 
same time copies of such requests shall be furnished to 
the other parties. The court shall inform counsel of 
its proposed action upon the request; and it shall 
furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed 
instructions, unless the parties stipulate that such 
instructions may be given orally, or otherwise waive 
this requirement. 
(b) Upon each written request so presented and 
given, or refused, the court shall endorse its decision 
and shall initial or sign it. If part be given and 
part refused, the court shall distinguish, showing by 
the endorsement what part of the charge was given and 
what part was refused. 
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of 
the charge or omission therefrom unless he objects 
thereto before the jury is instructed, stating 
distinctly the matter to which he objects and the 
ground of his objection. Notwithstanding a party's 
failure to object, error may be assigned to 
instructions in order to avoid a manifest injustice. 
(d) The court shall not comment on the evidence in 
the case, and if the court refers to any of the 
evidence, it shall instruct the jury that they are the 
exclusive judges of all questions of fact. 
(e) Arguments of the respective parties shall be 
made after the court has instructed the jury. Unless 
otherwise provided by law, any limitation upon time for 
argument shall be within the discretion of the court. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 4 01 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having nay 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than in would be without the 
evidence. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 4 02 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as 
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United 
States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, 
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules 
applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is 
not relevant is not admissible. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 4 03 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
ADDENDUM 2 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Under Utah law, any person, agency, or corporation may pay 
maternity expenses, related medical or hospital, and necessary 
living expenses of the mother preceding and during confinement. 
However, that act of paying is by law considered an act of charity 
and may not be made for the purpose of inducing the mother, parent, 
or legal guardian to place the child for adoption, consent to an 
adoption, or cooperate in the completion of an adoption. 
Whether a person consents to the adoption of his or her child 
is a personal and private act of that person and may not be bought 
or bartered for under the law. A natural parent at any time may 
choose not to consent to an adoption. By so choosing, that person 
does not subject himself or herself to criminal responsibility 
unless you find from the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt 
each and every element of the offense of Theft by Deception, as 
charged in the Informations have been established. 
-^ 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation of that client will be directly adverse to another 
client, unless: 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation 
will not adversely affect the relationship with the other 
client; and 
(2) each client consents after consultation. 
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation of that client may be materially limited by the 
lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, 
or by the lawyer's own interests, unless: 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation 
will not be adversely affected; and 
(2) the client consents after consultation. When 
representation of multiple clients in a single matter is 
undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of 
the implications of the common representation and the 
advantages and risks involved. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3_ 
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction 
with a client or knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, 
security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless: 
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer 
acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client 
and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the 
client in a manner which can be reasonably understood by 
the client: 
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to 
seek the advise of independent counsel in the transaction: 
and 
(3) the client consents in writing thereto. 
rfjrr 
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ADDENDUM 3 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED VOIR DIRE 
HL60 WSTfrej!" C99iRT 
Third Judi «ul District 
APR 8 1994 
S.TV-T L A K E CWU.T*. / V.1.   UJ 
ROGER K. SCOWCROFT, (#5141) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
.Deputy Cidrtt 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS M. VIGIL, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
VOIR DIRE QUESTIONS 
Case No. 931901605FS 
and 931901607FS 
JUDGE TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
The defendant, THOMAS M. VIGIL, respectfully submits the 
following interrogatories for the voir dire of the prospective 
jurors in the above-numbered case. 
QUESTIONS FOR THE JURY PANEL 
1. What is your educational background? 
2. What is your profession and the profession of your 
spouse? 
3. Have you ever, in any capacity, been involved in the 
adoption of a child? What was your experience? 
4. Do you have any strong feelings or opinions about 
adoption? 
5. Do you have children? If so: 
State the age of each of these children. 
6. Do you belong to any organizations dealing with victim 
nrma 
support groups? 
7. Have you been involved with any groups whose goals are to 
make changes in the criminal justice system? If so, what group? 
8. What is your main source of news? 
9. Have any of you heard about this case? What did you hear 
and where did you hear it? 
10. Have any of you see any recent television programs, or 
received other information, depicting attempted adoptions? What 
did you hear? 
11. Do any of you know the prosecutor in this case? 
12. Do any of you know any of the State's witnesses? 
13. Do any of you know Mr. Vigil or Mrs. Vigil? 
14. Do any of you know Mr. Vigil's attorney? 
15. Have any of you, your close friends or relatives, ever 
been employed by the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office or any 
other law enforcement agency? If so: 
What was the nature of the employment? 
When were you so employed? 
16. The defendant may or may not be a witness in this case. 
Would you be able to weigh the defendant's testimony the same as 
any other witness? 
17. Are there any of you who would tend to give more 
credibility to the testimony of a police officer, merely because he 
or she is a police officer, than you would to any other witness? 
18. Have you lived in any place other than Salt Lake County 
for any length of time? If so: 
2 
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How long have :;. ,
 4 >-** ; - \ * ;.<ske County? 
Where did
 :uu live Dei here? 
decide t^ . ^ i„* Lake County? 
ive *:*•> : * •• ,,.*!.- ,*. friends, or* relatives worked 
f o r , correctional lac .jency? 
io vnn feavo elatives . c friends who are, 
been, law enforcement officers? 
before „" I I 
so: 
What type of case was it? 
When.' 
Would that experience affect your ability to serve 011 
this jury in a fair and impartial manner? 
22. Have a.- of you or your close friends ti. relatives ever 
been th& victim OJ. a criminal «, fferise"11 I! 
What w*<= tbc nature of the offense? 
Was anybody charged, arrested c- convicted of that 
offense? 
23 You will later be instructed concerning certain 
protection or presumptions i n the 1 aw. In this case, those are all 
:i i i fa \ ci : : 'f Mr I|; i :i g i 3 a,,i id Mi :s V i ji 3 „, tt le accused. Are there any 
of you who believe that our system has gone too far, and that the 
person charged crime has too many protect! r 
24. Does the mere fact that Mr,, Vjigiii dnti Mis. Vigil is 
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charged with an offense in the Information cause any of you to 
believe that they are probably guilty as charged? 
25. You will be instructed that an individual accused of a 
crime is presume to be innocent. Do any of you feel that Mr. Vigil 
and Mrs. Vigil have a burden to prove innocence? 
26. Do you understand that Mr. Vigil and Mrs. Vigil have no 
obligation to testify? Do any of you nevertheless feel they should 
come forward and testify? 
27. If, after hearing the evidence, you came to the 
conclusion that the prosecution had not proven the guilt of the 
accused beyond a reasonable doubt, and you found that a majority of 
the jurors believed the defendant was guilty, would you change your 
verdict only because you were in the minority? 
28. Are there any of you who are not in such a fair and 
impartial state of mind that you would not be satisfied to have a 
juror possessing your mental state judge the evidence if you or 
your loved ones were on trial here? In other words, would you want 
someone with your state of mind sitting as a juror on a case if you 
were the defendant? 
29. Do any of you, for whatever reason, have such strong 
feelings about the crime of Theft by Deception or about this case 
that your judgment in this case might be affected? 
30. Do any of you have any problems with your hearing, sight 
or any other medical problem which would impair your ability -to 
devote full attention to this trial? 
31. Is there anything occurring in your life at the present 
4 
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time that would prevent you from giving your full attention Lw uus 
case? 
DATED this -3 day of April, 1994. 
( / ) cz^T'C^r^U C^< 
ROGER K. SCOWCROFT 
Attorney for Defend 
MAILED/DELIVERED a cop^ - ' the foregoing to tin1 nff kv of II i 
* !i Mint y ALU "outh, Salt Lake Ci t y , Utah 84111 
this S day :;* April, 1994. 
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